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Abstract. This study explores the structural features and mechanisms that allow relatively 
small Korean companies to secure dominant market positions in their respective business 
sectors. By examining five specific aspects of their operations (financing structure, 
financial structure, growth structure, R&D activities, and business structure), the source of 
these companies‘ unique success is better understood. Ultimately, our findings show that 
when these five aspects work together as a single and highly efficient ―machine,‖ these 
Korean powerhouses are able to secure and maintain dominant market positions in the 
global market. Further, we extend the concept of Korean hidden champions based on the 
various results of our analysis to propose six criteria useful to redefining them as Korean 
powerhouses. 
Keywords. Corporate systems, Hidden champions, Global market leaders, Korean 
companies, Structural diversity 
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1. Introduction 
ince the Korean War, the Republic of Korea has experienced a high level of 
economic growth and maintained the growth engine of its economy for quite 
a long time on the basis of an export-oriented growth strategy led by large 
manufacturing enterprises. The large enterprise-oriented unbalanced-growth policy 
aimed at creating a trickle down effect, which the Korean government has pushed 
consistently, has adhered to large enterprise–oriented economic development 
patterns and economic systems. This has resulted in the gradual establishment of a 
large enterprise–oriented business ecosystem throughout Korean industry. 
Moreover, within the business ecosystem created based on large enterprise–
oriented economic development patterns and economic systems, large business 
groups in Korea, such as Samsung Group, Hyundai Motor Group, and LG Group, 
were able to grow into key players that led Korea‘s unprecedented rapid economic 
growth, and they could take an advantageous position to continue expanding their 
influence in the rapidly changing economic environment. 
On the one hand, the large enterprise–oriented economic growth policy, which 
aimed not only to allow recovery after Korea‘s national economic collapse as a 
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direct consequence of the Korean War but also to promote the rapid growth of the 
Korean economy, expecting a trickle-down effect
i
, is considered to be a policy that 
has driven large enterprise–biased development and the visible and qualitative 
growth of the Korean economy in a short period of time. On the other hand, 
however, there is also an argument this policy direction on the part of the Korean 
government has instead caused increasing polarization between small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) and large enterprises (LEs) in many different spheres, 
which ultimately brought on the evolution of an aberrational and abnormal 
business environment—a large number of SMEs rely heavily on a small number of 
LEs in many ways—so that the self-reliance, growth potential, and competitiveness 
of SMEs has been consistently weakened. Such arguments about and evaluations of 
the direction of Korea‘s economic growth as staked out by the Koreas government 
have been proven from various perspectives through diverse major economic 
indicators released by many different economic institutions. However, based on the 
objective fact that as of 2013, LEs, making up 0.2 percent of all manufacturing 
businesses, have created 52.4 percent of total manufacturing output or 50.5 percent 
of gross value added in the manufacturing sector,
ii
 we can verify the LE-dependent 
growth structure in the Korean business ecosystem, and can imagine that the 
growth disparity between LEs and SMEsproceeded from the growth structure. 
In the strictest sense, the LE-oriented economic structure that has taken firm 
root within today‘s Korean economy means a ―standardized export items–oriented 
economic structure led by a very small minority of large business groups‖; 
therefore, it is considered that from the macroeconomic perspective, such an 
economic structure is quite an unstable structure in which to grow the Korean 
economy for a long time while maintainingits structural stability and sustainability. 
In such an economic structure, if a very small minority of large business groups 
faces the inevitable structural crisis caused by internal or external economic 
factors, or if they fall into stagnation with poor business performance, then there is 
a high possibility that the direct or indirect aftermath of crisis and stagnation will 
spread rapidly to whole Korean economy; therefore, it can be inferred that such an 
economic structure is technically vulnerable to internal and external economic 
shock. Thus, in order to solve the underlying problems taking firm root within 
Korea‘s economic structure, which is characterized as biased and monolithic, the 
growth of small and middle-standing enterprises in both quantity and quality is 
required; there needs to be a recognition of the importance of these enterprises as 
potential key players that can lead the Korean economy to become stable in the 
future. 
In the extension of such recognitions and perspectives, this study 
wholeheartedly accepts the argument that the importance of another new growth 
engine proceeding from SMEs should be magnified and discussedfrom various 
aspects as much as the importance of existing growth engines led mainly by large 
business groups in Korea. Therefore, this study notes that the Korean government 
has consistently attempted to discover small or middle-standing enterprises with 
high growth potential, has been giving significant support to these enterprises 
through a diverse range of channels, and has put considerable effort into helping 
these enterprises grow as key players with high levels of competitiveness in the 
domestic or overseas market. Above all, though, this study strongly highlights that 
careful study and analysis of small or middle-standing enterprises that have already 
secured a high level of self-reliance, high growth potential, and unmatched 
competitiveness—all factors that enable them to survive in the domestic or 
overseas market—has to precede the discovery and support of enterprises with 
such potential factors. In this study, we therefore consider small or middle-standing 
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enterprises that have achieved a high level of self-reliance and unmatched 
competitiveness in the global market as much as large business groups.
iii
 
To do so, we decide to look at 30 selected companies of the ―2015 World-Class 
300 & Global Specialized Enterprise Cultivation Project‖—jointly selected by the 
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) and the Small and Medium 
Business Administration (SMBA) in July 2015—as the subject of study for the 
primary selection. Among these 30 companies, we choose, for the secondary 
selection, 19 companies each in a number-one position in the domestic market or 
the overseas market, and, finally, 11 out of 19 companies listed on the Korean 
stock market are selected as the subject of this study (see Table 1). The reason that 
we choose the target companies for analysis from among the 30 companies selected 
by the Korean government is that it is necessary to consider and analyze the 
characteristics of the ―companies with growth potential‖ based on the Korean 
government‘s current criteria. Further, we take a special interest in these 11 
companies because of their common features: that they have occupied and held a 
dominant and unique market position in specific business sectors despite not being 
large business groups with favorable conditions in many different spheres. 
The main aim of this study is to examine the structural features and mechanisms 
of the corporate systems of the aforementioned 11 companies. To do so, we focus 
on uncovering the differences in corporate systems of these 11 companies from 
various perspectives, compared to other companies in the same industries having a 
similar business scale. In particular, by devoting our attention to examining five 
structures or sectors (i.e., financing structure, financial structure, growth structure, 
R&D activities, and business structure) from among the various structures that 
comprise each of the 11 companies‘ corporate systems, we analyze how these 11 
companies create the mechanisms for creating a business environment that helps 
them to hold a dominant and unique market position in a specific business sector 
by building their corporate systems in a manner distinct from those of other 
companies; and present a new criteria for Korean-type hidden champions based on 
this mechanism. 
 
2. Various arguments about “hidden champions” 
The companies that have secured a high level of self-reliance, high growth 
potential, and unmatched competitiveness that enable them to survive in the global 
market are defined from various perspectives. Previous studies that examined such 
types of companies defined them as ―hidden champions,‖ and have attempted to 
analyze them mainly based on a business management perspective and 
methodology. The concept of hidden champions was first introduced by Simon 
(1990), and he defined the concept using the following three criteria: (i) number 
one, two, or three in the global market, or number one on its continent; (ii) revenue 
below $4 billion; and (iii)a low level of public awareness (Simon, 2009, p. 15). 
In some studies, the terms ―hidden champion‖ and ―small giant‖ has been used 
without precise criteria and classification, but the concept in most studies has been 
redefined in accordance with each researcher‘s own academic argument, but 
basically based on Simon‘s perspective on hidden champions. However, it can be 
said that such companies are generally understood to be ―strong companies with 
global competitiveness or market competitiveness.‖ Voudouris et al. (2000) 
attempt to define a company that fulfills the following four criteria as a Greek 
hidden champion: (i) Greek owned; (ii) more than 20 and fewer than 250 
employees; (iii) obtaining some revenues from outside Greece or being part of joint 
ventures or other types of cooperation with companies from outside Greece; and 
(iv) excellent performance for the last five years in several financial measures. 
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Further, Lee (2009) provides another definition of a hidden champion as a 
company with the largest share in the domestic market or one of the top three in the 
world market and revenue of less than KRW 1 trillion. Further, Kim (2010) frames 
a more extended definition of a hidden champion as company that has become a 
market leader in the world market by pursuing niche markets despite its small size. 
Moreover, since 2009, the Korea Exchange (KRX) has selected hidden champions 
from among the companies listed on the KOSDAQ market. According to its 
standards, hidden champions are categorized as companies that have world-class 
levels of technology and competitiveness; whose main items are in the number one, 
two, or three market share position in the world market; and who are expected to 
activate the KOSDAQ market. 
Earlier studies on hidden champions were mainly conducted on German-type 
hidden champions, but currently the subject of study in the research field is 
expanding, as various types of hidden champions were gradually discovered in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, Japan, and so on (Simon, 
1996). Moreover, a large number of studies regarding the companies that have 
qualified as hidden champions in various countries are based on a business 
management methodology as an analytical framework for study, and these studies 
provide key success factors and features based on such a framework. The work of 
Simon (1996), Venohr & Meyer (2007), Mäkeläinen (2014), Boga (2012), and 
Voudouris et al. (2000) are representative studies that attempt to examine hidden 
champions thoroughly based on a business management perspective, and focus on 
uncovering various characteristics and lessons from many different types of hidden 
champions. 
However, there are relatively fewer arguments regarding Korean hidden 
champions; and these have not been actively extended. It can be said that the main 
reason for this lies in the special characteristics of Korean academia, which tends to 
center its research focus and direction on large enterprise–oriented study or specific 
industry–oriented study. It is an undeniable fact that hidden champions as a subject 
of study have not attracted the attention of a large number of researchers in Korean 
academia for quite a long time, and because of this, multifaceted and in-depth 
research into hidden champions has not been actively conducted. Thus, the body of 
research regarding hidden champions has been relatively less diversenot only in 
quantity but also in quality. Nevertheless, studies that have set Korean hidden 
champions as the subject of analysis have been consistently carried out by some 
researchers and a small number ofresearch groups. Lee (2009) attempts to explore 
success types and pitfalls in 24 Korean hidden champions and to categorize them 
into eight types to suggest the implications for corporate strategy and government 
policy; Kim (2010) provides a desirable strategy and success model for the growth 
of Korean hidden champions through critical success factor analysis of global 
hidden champions, and suggests strategic directions for them. Further, Chang & Ko 
(2014) attempt to categorize various key success factors of hidden champions and 
to examine whether or not small Korean IT companies that have successfully 
grown into small but globally competitive enterprises have such success factors in 
a strategic area and management area. 
However, the analysis of success factors and the unique features of hidden 
champions in a large number of previous studies is very comprehensive, and has 
been mainly conducted based on a business management perspective and 
methodology; therefore, these studies are limited in their ability to progress to in-
depth study and an academic argument regarding the various structures that 
comprise their corporate systems. Therefore, in order to attempt to provide in-depth 
and various arguments on hidden champions, it is necessary to analyze the diverse 
structural features embedded in their corporate systems; it is also necessary to 
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approach the distinguishing features of hidden champions from an economic 
perspective and methodology by comparing hidden champions with other 
companies in the same industry. 
 
3. The Korean powerhouses 
As mentioned in the introduction, the purpose of this study is to uncover the 
structural features of 11 selected companies; how these structural features are any 
different from other companies in the same industry having a similar business 
scale; and what mechanism helps them to hold the number one positions in their 
global markets, by analyzing their empirical data. 
As of 2014, the average sales of the 11 selected companies were 137,197 
million KRW, and 10 companies employed less than 600 employees. These 11 
companies are engaged in various business sectors such as electronic components, 
semiconductors, mechanical equipment, medical products, chemical products, and 
metallic mineral products. More than half of these companies are listed on the 
KOSDAQ market—the rest of them are listed on the KOSPI market—and on 
average it has taken 13 years since foundation to be listed on the Korean securities 
market (See Table 1). According to the Framework Act of Small and Medium 
Business,
iv
 six out of 11 companies are classified as SMEs, but the other five 
companies—which do not belong toa ―Business Group Subject to Limitations on 
Cross-Shareholding,‖ and have gone beyond the bounds of SMEs in line with the 
law—are categorized as middle-standing enterprises.
v
 Moreover, all of the 11 
companies have at least onesubsidiary company: six companies own more than 
nine subsidiary companies, and the other five companies have fewer than three 
subsidiary companies. In terms of market position, six companies are in the number 
one position in the domestic market; four companies hold the number one position 
in the overseas market; and one company occupies the number one position in both 
markets. 
 
Table 1. The Korean powerhouses 
 
Notes:: KOSPI market; : KOSDAQ market; D: Domestic market; W: World market. Figures in 
parentheses refer to the year of flotation on the stock exchange.All data are based on their fiscal year 
2014. 
Source: The Annual Reports, each company; Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy; Small and 
Medium Business Administration. 
 
For the remainder of this paper, the 11 selected companies, as shown in Table 1, 
are named ―the Korean powerhouses.‖ These 11 companies are not selected based 
on Simon‘s criteria for hidden champions but rather follow extended criteria based 
on the findings of our study; therefore, it is quite difficult to define these 
companies as hidden champions. Using the perspective of the Korean powerhouses 
in the following sections, this study explores the mechanism for creating a business 
environment that helps to hold a dominant and unique market position in specific 

















KISCO   non-SME Reactive Dyes 190,395 440 1D £ 1977 [1995] 
METABIOMED SME Medical Diagnosis 35,475 181 1W  1990 [2008] 
VATECH non-SME 2D X-Ray Diagnostic Device 96,863 512 1
D
  1992 [2006] 
BORYUNG PHARM non-SME High Blood Pressure Drug 359,490 1,044 1D £ 1963 [1988] 




 £ 2000 [2009] 
CELL BIOTECH SME Mixed Lactic Acid Bacteria 40,461 101 1W  1995 [2002] 




  2003 [2003] 
EO TECHNICS non-SME Semiconductor Marker 273,216 576 1W  1989 [2000] 
NK SME High-Pressure Gas Cylinder 207,894 224 1
D
 £ 1984 [2008] 
TELECHIPS SME Automotive Parts 75,272 262 1W  1999 [2004] 
HANLA IMS SME Level System 41,393 153 1
D
  1995 [2007] 
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by devoting our attention to examining financing structure, financial structure, 
growth structure, R&D activities, and business structure. 
3.1. The high possibility of stable financing led by a self-financing-
dominant financing structure 
Manifold financing methods are available for companies to raise the funds 
necessary for managing their business activities, and they have their own unique 
characteristics and differences in various companies. Further, from a 
macroeconomic perspective, the various financing methods that companies opt for 
in order to raise funds may reveal some generalized country-specific features 
(Miyamoto, 2004). The method of financing used to obtain the necessary funds can 
be categorized to some degree according to the country or company. However, this 
does not mean that a specific method of financing and its type is not accompanied 
by evolution (Kim, 2015a). 
Financing methods are roughly classified into self-financing and external 
financing methods. Self-financing is a method of financing in which some the 
profits created from the company‘s business performance are converted into capital 
when needed, that is, a self-reliance financing method for companies to raise the 
necessary funds. In contrast, external financing, which can be subdivided into 
direct financing and indirect financing, is a method of financing in which a 
company obtains the necessary funds from outside the company in the form of 
borrowed capital, equity issues, and so on. External financing is ultimately a 
potential debt-reliance financing method for companies to raise the necessary 
funds; therefore, fund providers‘ direct or indirect effect on companies is 
inevitable, and potential intervention in management by fund providers can be 
expected. 
In light of this, if companies depend more on self-financing than on external 
financing to obtain the necessary funds, or if companies rely more on funds from 
internal sources than from external sources, they have a better chance of carrying 
out business activities on positive lines while firmly maintaining the business 
directions they seek. In particular, in the case of large enterprises such as the 
Toyota Group in Japan and the Hyundai Motor Group in Korea, the common trend 
is that the level of dependence on self-financing is maintained with an overall 
upward tendency or at a high level (Kim, 2015a).  
 
 
Figure 1. Retained earnings in stockholders’ equity 
Notes: The data cover the companies in the manufacturing sector.All data are based on their fiscal 
year. 
Source: Computed by the author using data from Financial Statement Analysis, for the indicated 















Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 3(2), W.J. Kim, p.284-308 
290 
290 
Judging from this trend, it can be inferred that a financing condition that helps 
companies to raise the necessary funds more stablyfrom inside the company has 
been created in companies showing such a trend, rather than in companies not 
showing such a trend.In contrast, in the case of SMEs in the manufacturing sector, 
there is a trend for the proportion of retained earnings in stockholders‘ equity, 
which can be an internal source of self-financing, to be maintained at lower levels 
than that of LEs in the manufacturing sector (See Figure 1). What this trend 
indicates is that the level of dependence on self-financing SMEs can secure is 
generally lower than the level of dependence on self-financing LEs can secure 
when they raise the funds necessary for managing their business activities. 
However, it is identified that the Korean powerhouses have particular 
distinguishing features in self-financing that are unlike those of typical SMEs. To 
understand the Korean powerhouses‘ financing methods clearly, it is necessary to 
calculate an index that shows how they actually obtain the funds necessary to 
manage their business activities every year. This index considers the ―financing 
dependence‖ of the Korean powerhouses and quantifies their level of dependence 
on direct financing (DIRECTt), indirect financing (INDIRECTt), and self-financing 
(SELFt) in year t. Financing dependence is an objective measure that shows the 
level of dependence on their financing methods, and values of DIRECTt, 
INDIRECTt, and SELFt that are closer to 1.000 indicate a stronger dependence on 
the respective financing method. These values are calculated using data from the 
Repository of Korea‘s Corporate Filings Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer 
(DART). From this calculation, the financing structures for the Korean 
powerhouses can be identified (see Figure 2). 
The result of our analysis of the Korean powerhouses‘ financing methods 
during the 1998–2014 period shows that a financing condition has been created that 
allows them to rely most heavily on self-financing in order to raise the funds they 
need to manage their business activities. Overall, SELFt remained between 0.545 
and 0.620 from 2001 to 2013, without irregular increases or decreases in values, 
but increased slightly to 0.636 in 2014; INDIRECTt remained at a constant level 
around 0.300, without a significant rise or drop during the past eight years; and 
DIRECTtdecreased drastically until 2008 and remained at a very low level, with a 
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Figure 2. Financing dependence of the Korean powerhouses 
Notes: The source of financing in the Korean powerhouses in the year t (SOURCEt), their level of 
dependence on indirect financing in the year t (INDIRECTt), that on direct financing in the year t 
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Where STDt represents the short-term debt in the year t; LTDt is the long-term debt in the year t; FCDt 
is the foreign currency debt in the year t; CSCt is the capital stock (common) in the year t; PCSt is the 
preferred capital stock in the year t; CBt is the corporate bond in the year t; CPt is the commercial 
paper in the year t; and TESt represents the total earned surplus in the year t. All data are based on 
their fiscal year. 
Source: Computed by the author. 
 
Of course, the level of dependence on self-financing does not mean that the 
Korean powerhouses are actually spending all the funds from their retained internal 
sources on the self-financing method to manage their business activities every year. 
However, a high level of dependence on self-financing can be construed as 
meaning that the Korean powerhouses hold a large amount of retained earnings, 
which can be an internal source of self-financing, in all the funds from internal and 
external sources they can secure every year to manage their business activities. 
Ultimately, retained earnings refer to the part of their possessed funds not derived 
from external funds; therefore, there is relatively less risk to companies when they 
obtain the necessary funds through internal funds, compared to when they obtain 
the necessary funds through external funds that inevitably involve various risks. To 
put it another way, from the companies‘ point of view, their high level of 
dependence on self-financing means that a stable financing method through funds 
from internal sources has been secured.Therefore, it can be said that in the Korean 
powerhouses whose level of dependence on self-financing is quite high, an 
environment that helps them to stably raise the funds necessary for managing their 
business activities through self-financing has been created so that they have a better 
chance of carrying out business activities along positive lines while firmly 
maintaining the business directions they seek. This can act as a factor that has a 
positive effect on other structures (or sectors) that comprise their corporate 
systems. 
3.2. Evolution towards (maintenance of) non-debt-dependent financial 
structure 
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As of 2014, the debt ratio of Korean companies categorized into the 
manufacturing industry was 89.24 percent.
vi
 Their debt ratio was recorded at 
303.02 percent in 1998, but it has gradually decreased every year since then. As 
shown in Figure 3, their debt ratio has shown a gradual decreasing tendency each 
year regardless of the size of the company, and the changes in debt ratio have been 
relatively stable since the mid-2000s. However, the debt ratio data of 
manufacturing companies show one notable feature: the debt ratios of SMEs were 
generally far higher than those of LEs for most of the year. As of 2014, the debt 
ratios of SMEs and LEs were 155.44 percent and 73.41 percent, respectively, and 
there was a widening gap between SMEs and LEs. Through such debt ratio data, it 
can be inferred that Korean SMEs in the manufacturing sector have a strong 
tendency to manage their businesses by depending more heavily on debt for any 
reason than do Korean LEs in the manufacturing sector. 
If the tendency to manage the company depending heavily on debt is stronger in 
SMEs than in LEs, then it is conceivable that the Korean powerhouses—which are 
categorized as small or middle-standing enterprises—should have a similar 
tendency to the typical Korean SMEs. This is not only an argument regarding the 
tendency to manage the company, but also an argument on how what level of 
structural stability and soundness in the financial aspect has been practically 
secured in the company. Therefore, in order to approach such an argument clearly, 
it is necessary to compare the Korean powerhouses with other companies in the 
same industry having a similar business scale, rather than comparing them with 
typical LEs. This would be a much more persuasive comparison. 
 
 
Figure 3. Debt ratio by company size 
Notes: The data cover the companies in the manufacturing sector.All data are based on their fiscal 
year. 
Source: Financial Statement Analysis, for the indicated years, The Bank of Korea. 
 
Thus, we focus on uncovering the financial features of the Korean powerhouses 
by comparing them with other companies in the same industry having a similar 
business scale. To do so, the debt ratio (DR) and total borrowings and bonds 
payable to total assets (TBTA) of the Korean powerhouses are calculated and 
analyzed (see Figure 4). The result of our analysis shows that, interestingly, the 
Korean powerhouses have maintained for a long time (or are gradually evolving 
towards) at least one feature among the following three: 
(i) The levels of both DR and TBTA are lower than those in other companies 
in the same industry [D&B-safe type] 
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(ii) The level of DR is lower than that in other companies in the same industry 
[D-safe type] 
(iii)  The level of TBTA is lower than that in other companies in the same 
industry [B-safe type] 
Seven companies are categorized as the D&B-safe type: five of them have 
maintained feature (i) for a long time, and the other two companies are gradually 
evolving towards such a feature. Three companies are classified as the D-safe type: 
two of them have maintained feature (ii) for a long time, and one company 
continues to evolve towards this feature. One out of 11 companies is categorized as 
the B-safe type, maintaining feature (iii) for quite a long time. 
In summary, our analysis of the financial structure revealed that the Korean 
powerhouses have common ground, a ―non-debt-dependent financial structure,‖ 
which they have maintained for a long time or are gradually evolving towards. 
More than half of the Korean powerhouses have maintained lower levels of both 
DR and TBTA than other companies in the same industry, and for the rest of the 
Korean powerhouses, at least one of these has been at a lower level than in other 
companies in the same industry.Such a result needs to be highlighted because the 
non-debt-dependent financial structure of the Korean powerhouses is actually 
difficult for Korean SMEs to maintain. In general, in the case of LEs, it is likely 
that a solid management structure, huge capital, and rapidly accumulating funds 
from internal sources will become positive factors that help them to reduce the 
level of dependence on debt or loans for managing their business activities. 
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Figure 4. Levels of DR and TBTA: The Korean powerhouses vs. other companies in the 
same field 
Notes: : The Korean powerhouses; : Other companies in the same field; (M): Maintenance; (E): 
Evolution.All data are based on their fiscal year. 
TBTAt= (Total borrowings and bonds payablet Total assetst )×100 
DRt= (Total liabilitiest Stockholders' equityt) ×100 
Source: Computed by the author using data from the Annual Reports, for the indicated years, each 
company;Financial Statement Analysis, for the indicated years, The Bank of Korea. 
 
However, in contrast, in the case of SMEs, such factors have not been relatively 
sufficient, so that SMEs‘ level of dependence on debt or loans for managing their 
business activities is even higher than that of LEs in general. Therefore, it is highly 
likely that SMEs maintain a relatively unhealthy (or unstable) financial structure in 
comparison with LEs. Nevertheless, the Korean powerhouses, unlike the typical 
SMEs, have maintained a non-debt-dependent financial structure, which could be 
part of their corporate system with a healthy financial structure, and could also be a 
―strong LE-tested financial structure‖ that is difficult for typical SMEs to maintain. 
As a result, such a structural feature allows the Korean powerhouses to create an 
environment that helps them to stably manage their business activities; therefore, 
they have a better chance of carrying out business activities along positive lines 
while firmly maintaining the business directions they seek. This can act as a factor 
that has a positive effect on other structures (or sectors) that comprise their 
corporate systems. 
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3.3. The propensity for non-debt-led growth 
The growth of a company can be defined from various perspectives. An external 
expansion of business scale proceeding from enlargement of the company‘s 
business activities can be one way to define the growth of the company; an internal 
expansion of business scale led by sales increase or profit increase can be another. 
There are various ways to define the growth of the company, but they all have one 
thing in common: in the end, the key factors that affect not only external growth 
but also the internal growth of the company bear a strong relation tothe source of 
funds that leads the company‘s growth. To put it plainly, the company is able to 
promote continuous investment activity for its growth on the premise that a source 
of investment funds for its business is prepared; it is also able to increase its sales 
and profits on the assumption that a source of funds for boosting its production is 
supported. Therefore, in discussing the growth of a company, it is essential to 
understand the relation between the growth of the company and the source of funds 
that promote its growth. In particular, in the case of Korean SMEs that show a high 
level of dependence on funds from external sources, it would be more reasonable to 
focus on the relation between their debt ratio and their growth. 
Woo & Choi (2015) attempt to examine the factors that affect the capital 
structure of growth companies by focusing on 933 KOSPI-listed companies and 
1,413 KOSDAQ-listed companies during the 1992–2013 period, which provides 
evidence that the higher the growth of a company, the higher its debt ratio, in both 
KOSPI-listed companies and KOSDAQ-listed companies. In expanding the results 
of their analysis, one can infer that in the case of Korean companies, there seems to 
be a positive correlation between the growth of a company and its debt ratio, so 
that the trend is that higher their debt ratio (the more their debt ratio increases), the 
higher their growth (the more their growth increases), and the lower their debt ratio 
(the more their debt ratio decreases), the lower their growth (the more their growth 
decreases). 
However, the Korean powerhouses are expected to show quite different trends, 
from the above trends. In order to validate whether there is a positive correlation 
between the growth of the Korean powerhouses and their debt ratios, we attempt to 
focus on examining two things: the relation between their sales growth and their 
debt ratios, and the relation between their operating profit growth and their debt 
ratios. A very interesting finding results from the analysis, as shown in Figure 5. 
If the Korean powerhouses show a definite positive correlation between their 
growth and their debt ratios, their debt ratios should increased compared to the 
previous year when the year-on-year rate of sales growth (or the year-on-year rate 
of operating profit growth) shows a positive value; their debt ratios should decrease 
compared to the previous year when the year-on-year rate of sales growth (or the 
year-on-year rate of operating profit growth) shows a negative value. To put it 
another way, if there is a definite positive correlation between their growth and 
their debt ratios, then most of the coordinate values in scatter charts [A] and [B] of 
Figure 5 should be distributed in quadrants I or III. 
However, as the result clearly shows, about half of the coordinate values are 
distributed in quadrants II or IV. Coordinate values distributed in quadrants II or IV 
represent either (1) the period of each year that shows a decrease in debt ratio 
compared to the previous year even though the year-on-year rate of sales growth 
(or the year-on-year rate of operating profit growth) shows a positive value, or (2) 
the period of each year that shows an increase in debt ratio compared to the 
previous year even though the year-on-year rate of sales growth (or the year-on-
year rate of operating profit growth) shows a negative value. Such distributions of 
coordinate values indicate that there is also a negative correlation between the 
growth of the Korean powerhouses and their debt ratios. Thus, it is difficult to 
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conclude that the Korean powerhouses have the propensity for non-debt-led 
growth, unlike KOSPI-listed companies or KOSDAQ-listed companies, which 
have partially shown the propensity for non-debt-led growth. 
 
 
Figure 5.Correlation between debt and growth: The Korean powerhouses 
Notes: Variations in debt ratiot=Debt ratiot-Debt ratiot-1Two samples [(–329, 9); (–5, 751)] in chart 
[A] and seven samples [(6, 302); (33, 17476); (–20, 468); (–329,31); (–1, 805); (–5, 787); (3, 3064)] 
in chart [B] are not shown.Fiscal years that showed negative sales growth or negative operating profit 
are excluded from the calculation.All data are based on the fiscal year after floating the business on a 
stock market. 
Source: Computed by the author using data from Repository of Korea's Corporate Filings Data 
Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer (DART). 
 
The growth of a company is greatly affected by debt, which cannot be construed 
as purely positive. In principle, company debt proceeds from funds from external 
sources; therefore, the more the growth of the company is significantly affected by 
external factors, the more it will be strongly dependent on climate changes in 
external factors. From a larger perspective, there is a strong possibility that the 
growth of a company depending on a huge amount of debt in itself can act as a 
factor that hampers the stable growth of the company. Thus, it can be highly 
expected that companies with the propensity for debt-led growth will be exposed to 
a relatively less stable growth environment than are other companies that have the 
propensity for non-debt-led growth. Therefore, it can be inferred that the Korean 
powerhouses show growth regardless of the increase of their debt ratios, so that 
they are able to have a favorable environment for stable growth in the long-term. 
Further, as such a growth environment is being embedded in the corporate systems 
of the Korean power houses, they have a better chance of carrying out their 
business activities along positive lines while firmly maintaining the business 
directions they seek. This can act as a factor that has a positive effect on other 
structures (or sectors) that comprise their corporate systems. 
3.4. A high level of concentration on research and development activities 
and a dominant market position 
Research and development (R&D) activities are among the factors that affect 
the growth of a company and can be a ―stepping-stone‖ for the company, leading to 
continuous and long-term growth. It would be somewhat difficult for a company to 
achieve measurable growth within a short period of time only by leaning on its 
R&D activities, but a company can attempt to expand its long-term growth 
potential through continuous R&D activities for its products. The effect of R&D 
activities on products and the consequences of R&D activities for the company 
cannot be fully guaranteed, as they have not been shown to be effectivewithin a 
short period of time, and further continuous efforts and a large monetary 
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environment that allows it to undertake its best endeavors for R&D activities even 
when the company is fully aware of the importance of the R&D activities. 
However, as is quite clear, R&D activitiesare directly connected to securing the 
potential competitiveness of a company, and so the company needs to concentrate a 
large part of its capability on R&D activities, not only to hold a dominant and 
unique market position in business sectors on which it focuses but also to maintain 
its position for the long term. 
However, there is no clear consensus on how great a level of R&D activities a 
company needs to concentrate on. Further, supportive and persuasive evidence for 
the standard is not enough. Moreover, the level of concentration on R&D activities 
is very diverse depending on the industry in which each company is engaged. 
High-technology companies producing electronic equipment, medical machines, 
semiconductors, and so on, which have both a comparativelyfast-paced product life 
cycle and short product life, will have a much higher level of concentration and 
investment in R&D activities in order to more often develop existing products into 
new and advanced products than will other companies. Thus, in order to understand 
clearly the level of concentration on R&D activities in a company, comparing its 
level with that in other companies in the same industry rather than in different 
industries would provide a much more persuasive comparison. Based on such a 
perspective, we assign great importance to a high level of concentration on R&D 
activities—which is one of the key factors that allows the Korean powerhouses to 
hold the number one position in the global market—and attempt to analyze how 
great a level of R&D activities the Korean powerhouses actually concentrate on. 
We do so while focusing on the following two factors: the R&D intensity of the 
Korean powerhouses, that is, the level of their expenditure on R&D activities in 
total sales, and the amount of R&D expenditure that they actually pay for R&D 
activities. Based on these two factors, we attempt to compare the Korean 
powerhouses with other companies in the same industry having a similar 
employment scale and a similar business scale, as shown in Figure 6. The results of 
our analysis show that the Korean powerhouses have maintained for a long time (or 
are gradually evolving towards) at least one of the following two features: 
(i) Both the level of R&D intensity and the amount of R&D expenditure are 
higher than those in other companies in the same industry [I&E-strong 
type] 
(ii) The level of R&D intensity is higher than that in other companies in the 
same industry [I-strong type] 
Seven companies are categorized as the I&E-strong type: five of them have 
maintained feature (i) for a long time, and the other two have shown this feature 
since 2013. Three companies are classified as the I-strong type and have 
maintained feature (ii) for a long time. Exceptionally, one out of 11 companies is 
categorized as neither the I&E-strong type nor the I-strong type, but there is a clear 
trend that the levels of both R&D intensity and amount of R&D expenditure have 
gradually been increasing over a long period of time. 
In summary, our analysis of the level of concentration on R&D activities 
revealed that the Korean powerhouses have a feature in common: they have 
maintained a much higher level of concentration on R&D activities for their 
continuous growth for a long time, compared to other companies in the same 
industry, or they are gradually raising their level. More than half of the Korean 
powerhouses are maintaining both R&D intensity and R&D expenditure at a higher 
level than other companies in the same industry, and the rest show a much higher 
level of R&D intensity than other companies in the same industry, as shown in 
Figure 6. In expanding the results of our analysis, it can be inferred that the Korean 
powerhouses‘ concentration on R&D activities at a high level means a constant 
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attempt to expand the possibilities of continuous and stable growth. Further, 
expanding their growth potential indicates that they have a better chance of holding 
a more dominant market position than other companies. Of course, a company 
cannot easily secure the number one position in the global market by focusing only 
on R&D activities at a high level. However, as in the case of the Korean 
powerhouses holding a more dominant market position than other companies in the 
same industry, if a favorable environment for a company to concentrate its 
capability on R&D activities at a high level is gradually created or is sustained, the 
company is more likely to secure strong competitive technologies and items; 
therefore, the company has a better chance of surviving in a competitive market 
than do other companies. Additionally, if a business environment that helps a 
company to carry out its business activities along positive lines while firmly 
maintaining the business directions it seeks is prepared, then the company has a 
much better chance of concentrating on R&D activities at a higher level. 
 
 
Figure 6. R&D intensity and R&D expenditure: The Korean powerhouses vs. other 
companies in the same field 
Notes: : The Korean powerhouses; : Other companies in the same field (by size of employees); 
: Other companies in the same field (by type of business enterprise); (M): Maintenance; (E): 





Total salest  All data are based on their fiscal year. 
Source: The Annual Reports, for the indicated years, each company; Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technology, Survey of Research and Development in Korea, for the indicated years. 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 




3.5. Specific sector-specialized business structure and concentration on 
the global market with no spatial boundary 
While the Korean powerhouses hold the number one position in the domestic 
market or the overseas market, it is very difficult for a company to achieve the 
number one market position in a specific business sector over numerous 
competitors, and it is most likely only be possible once continual endeavors and 
many continuous investment activities are undertaken. Companies have held a 
dominant market position in specific business sectors, which can be construed as 
the outcome of their strategic choice about which market should be focused on to 
supply the products developedbased on their accumulated and differentiated 
technologies. In general, the financial capacity and management ability companies 
accumulate is not mature enough in the initial stage of their foundation, and so 
there is a high possibility for them to be faced withdifficult situations in many 
different spheres. Thus, companies that have not secured a competitive price or 
superior technology for their products show a tendency to carry forward their 
business centered around market information in easily accessible areas. However, 
as the companies have matured in many different spheres and their business scales 
have gradually expanded, they have started to diversify the supply market step by 
step and to concentrate their capability on the overseas market in order to find new 
purchasing demand. In other words, it is a very general trend that the companies 
attempt to find a way to make inroads in the domestic market first, and after getting 




Figure 7. Market concentration index 
Notes: Market Concentration Index (MCIt) = (Domestic salest – Amount of exportst) / (Domestic 
salest + Amount of exportst). 0 <MCIt≤ 1.0: Domestic Market-oriented; –1.0 ≤ MCIt< 0: Overseas 
Market-oriented.All data are based on their fiscal year. 
Source: Computed by the author using data from the financial Reports, for the indicated years, each 
company. 
 
However, this general trend cannot be seen in all the Korean powerhouses (11 
companies). To understand clearlythe tendency of market concentration in the 
Korean powerhouses, we calculate an index that can be used to assess whether they 
focus on the domestic or overseas market. This index considers the market 
concentration index (MCI), and is calculated based on the data provided in each of 
the Korean powerhouses‘ financial reports regarding sales figures in the domestic 
market and the amount of exports (see Figure 7). The MCI is an objective measure 
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1.000 indicates a stronger domestic market–oriented type, while a score 
approaching –1.000 indicates a stronger overseas market–oriented type. 
Our calculation shows that the Korean powerhouses have noting in common in 
terms of the tendency of market concentration; they display various tendencies in 
their market concentration. However, by looking in detail at the changes in their 
MCI scores, one finds that they can actually be classified into two different groups. 
Five companies categorized as ―Group I‖ have maintained a certain level of MCI 
score for a long time. In contrast, six companies are classified as ―Group II,‖ 
showing a gradual change in their MCI scores. 
To put it another way, the Korean powerhouses are categorized as companies 
that tend to focus strongly on aspecific market for a long period of time, or 
companies that focus on a variety of markets (see Figure 8). However, except for 
one company, all the Korean powerhouses have in common that the 
aforementioned trend—that companies attempt to find a way to make inroads in the 
domestic market first, and after getting their business on track, they ponder ways to 
gradually diversify into the overseas market—is not clear. There are companies 
that focus on the overseas market first and gradually increase their effort to make 
headway into the domestic market, and there are companies that concentrate on 




Figure 8. Types of market concentration 
Source: Constructed by the author. 
 
Further, there are also companies that ponder ways to diversify their customers 
from the domestic market to the overseas market and then concentrate on the 
domestic market again. Thus, the Korean powerhouses show various tendencies of 
market concentration, which indicates that they are well provided with conditions 
and environments that help them to focus on the markets wherever there are in 
demand. Therefore, the changes in the market direction on which each Korean 
powerhouse focuses are diverse. In other words, it can be inferred that the Korean 
powerhouses are not attempting to change the market on which they need to focus 
in a particular direction as time goes on, but rather they do not distinguish between 
the domestic market and the overseas market at the beginning and concentrate 
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Figure 9. Business structures of the Korean powerhouses 
Source: Constructed by the author. 
 
One of the core reasons that the Korean powerhouses concentrate onthe global 
market from the beginning, rather than carrying forward the supply market 
diversification from the domestic market to the overseas market, is that they have a 
―specific sector-specialized business structure,‖ which makes it advantageous for 
them to be a specialized company in a specific business sector. The business 
structure of the Korean powerhouses can be classified into five different groups, as 
shown in Figure 9. However, except for one company, whose business structure is 
categorized as Type E, the business structures of the rest of the Korean 
powerhouses are, in effect, identical, which is a specific sector-specialized business 
structure. The business structure, Type A, which seven companies have, is based 
on the capital relation with a parent company (a Korean powerhouse) and domestic 
and/or overseas subsidiary companies in the same (or similar) business sector with 
the parent company. Both Type B and Type C business structures, which can be 
classified as more advanced and robust than Type A, are organized based on a 
capital relation with three main subjects: a parent company, domestic and/or 
overseas subsidiary companies that have a capital relation with their parent 
company, and their domestic and/or overseas subsidiary companies in the same (or 
similar) business sector. One distinctive difference from Type B is that the Type C 
business structure is strongly based on a holding company system.
vii
 The Type D 
business structure, whichinvolves a dominant company not in the same business 
sector with a Korean powerhouse, a subsidiary company in the same business 
sector with a Korean powerhouse, and a Korean powerhouse in a capital relation, is 
described as a structure in which the Korean powerhouse has an effect on its 
subsidiary company but is influenced by its dominant company at the same time. 
In summary, Types A, B, C, and D show a structural feature in common, in that 
the Korean powerhouses are connected with their main subsidiary companies (and 
main subsidiary companies‘ subsidiary companies) in the same (or similar) 
business sector, based on a capital relation. Therefore, it can be said that four types 
of business structure are defined as a specific sector-specialized business structure 
that is advantageous for the Korean powerhouses as specialized companies in a 
specific business sector. However, Type E can be classified as a different type of 
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business structure that is structurally different from a specific sector-specialized 
business structure. In Type E, most subsidiary companies are engaged in totally 
different business sectors from their Korean powerhouses, and some subsidiary 
companies that have a capital relation with a Korean powerhouse are also in 
different business sectors. Therefore, it can be said that a business structure with 
such structural organization is closer to an overall business structure, which is 
advantageous for diversifying one‘s business sector. 
The fact that all Korean powerhouses, excluding one company with an overall 
business structure, have maintained a specific sector-specialized business structure 
needs to be highlighted. In particular, it is noteworthy that there is a slight 
difference in the type of business structure each Korean powerhouse has, but it is 
ultimately a business structure directly or indirectly connecting a Korean 
powerhouse and its subsidiary companies engaged in the same (or similar) business 
sector. This specific sector-specialized business structure, which is advantageous 
for focusing the capabilities of both a Korean powerhouse and its subsidiary 
companies on the same business sector, makes a Korean powerhouse specialize in 
one specific business sector more so than its rival companies. In a specific sector-
specialized business structure, the Korean powerhouses as parent companies do not 
attempt to expand the business sector of their subsidiary companies to various 
business sectors, but rather within the boundary of the business sector on which 
they are focusing; therefore, in the long view, they have a better chance of 
specializing in the business sector where they already have advantages and 
strengths. Further, it is highly likely that a stable environment, which allows them 
to concentrate their capability on any market (i.e., domestic or overseas market) 
regardless of market conditions, is maintained, as the Korean powerhouses have a 
better chance of specializing in a specific business sector. 
 
4. The structural mechanism of the Korean powerhouses 
In this paper, we devote our attention to uncovering structural differences and 
features of the Korean powerhouses, compared to other companies in the same 
industry, by examining their five structures or sectors (i.e., financing structure, 
financial structure, growth structure, R&D activities, and business structure). Each 
structure is independent from the others, functioning as a single structure, which is 
a key factor in their corporate systems. However, looking at the big picture, it can 
be seen that each structure is actually interlinked as a cogwheel so that each 
structure influences (or is influenced by) each other.Of course, the various 
structures comprising the Korean powerhouses‘ corporate systems are also 
interlinked with each other, and their corporate systems are affected by these 
various interlinked structures. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the Korean powerhouses have a feature in 
common: they have held dominants and unique market positions in specific 
business sectors despite not being large business groups with favorable conditions 
in many different spheres.Various factors allow the Korean powerhouses to hold 
dominant and unique market positions in the business sectors on which they focus, 
but this study calls attention to the environments that provide a better chance of 
carrying out business activities along positive lines while firmly maintaining the 
business directions the Korean powerhouses seek as a key factor. The structural 
mechanism for creating such environments begins with their financing structure. 
As revealed by an analysis of the financing structure of the Korean 
powerhouses, they are more dependent on the self-financing method to obtain the 
necessary funds for managing their business activities, rather than the external 
financing method (direct financing and indirect financing). In general, the more a 
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company depends on self-financing, the relatively less the company relies on 
external financing; therefore, this lightens the burden of various risks that are 
inevitable consequences when the company is dependent on obtaining the 
necessary funds from external sources. Moreover, once the company lowers the 
level of dependence on external funds and raises that on internal funds, the level of 
external subjects‘ direct or indirect effect on the company—which inevitably stems 
from funding offered by outsiders—is reduced. That is, if the financing structure of 
the company evolves towards a self-financing-dominant financing structure, the 
influence of external factors that can affect the company is weakened due to the 
weakening of the company‘s level of dependence on funds from external sources. 
Therefore, from the company‘s point of view, it has a better chance of securing a 
more stable financing environment. As such a stable financing environment is 
strongly embedded in the company, the company is able to deviate from the 
influence of external subjects on its business activities; therefore, it has a better 
chance of carrying out its business activities along positive lines while firmly 
maintaining the business directions the company seeks. 
As the Korean powerhouses are able to rely onan internal source for self-
financing at a higher level, their level of dependence on funds from external 
sources is relatively decreased. This can be construed as meaning that the tendency 
to depend heavily on debt or loans to manage their business activities is weaker. 
Thus, the Korean powerhouses tend towards lower dependence on debt or loans 
due to a high level of dependence on self-financing. And as a result, it can be 
inferred that their financial structure is likely to gradually evolve towards a non-
debt-dependent financial structure, or to maintain this structure for a long time. 
Further, by building such a financial structure, the Korean powerhouses have a 
better chance of carrying out their business activities along positive lines while 
firmly maintaining the business directions they seek, in an environment that helps 
them to stably manage their business activities. 
Moreover, the Korean powerhouses—which have established a stable financing 
environment led by a self-financing-dominant financing structure—are able to 
deviate from the corporate growth environment wherevariations in debt ratio are 
linked. To put it in another way, it is possible for the Korean powerhouses to 
evolve towards (or maintain) a non-debt-led growth structure, as a corporate 
growth environment that is not led by debt, and to which an increase in debt is 
irrelevant, is being created. In companies that have established such a growth 
environment, corporate growth is less likely to be influenced by external factors 
such as debt or loans; therefore, it can be inferred that it creates an advantage for 
the long-term and stable growth of the company. Eventually, the Korean 
powerhouses—through the stable growth environment embedded in their corporate 
system—have a better chance of carrying out their business activities along 
positive lines while firmly maintaining the business directions they seek. 
The aforementioned three structures (i.e., the self-financing-dominant financing 
structure, the non-debt-dependent financial structure, and the non-debt-led growth 
structure) provide strong possibilities and a stable environment for the Korean 
powerhouses, allowing them to carry out their business activities along positive 
lines while firmly maintaining the business directions they seek. This increases the 
possibility of the Korean powerhouses‘ concentrating on R&D activities at a high 
level. Thus, they are able to concentrate on their R&D activities at a high level 
under a stable business environment in which the business activities they are 
planningcan be secured, which indicates that they can continue expanding their 
sustained and long-term growth potential through development of strong 
competitive items and securing differentiated technologies. Eventually, the stable 
growth of the Korean powerhouses based onmarket competitiveness supported by 
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their products with the accumulation of differentiated technologies gives thema 
better chance of survival in various markets in competition withrival companies 
and provides a definite opportunity for them to concentrate a large part of their 
capability onthe global market with no spatial boundary at the beginning. 
Therefore, they have a better chance of holding a more dominant market position 
than other companies in the same industry and maintaining their market position 
for the long term. 
 
 
Figure 10. Structural mechanism of the Korean powerhouses 
Source: Constructed by the author. 
 
Furthermore, a stable business environment-which can be directly or indirectly 
provided by the aforementioned three structures-and a business-friendly corporate 
environment-which helps the Korean powerhouses to carry out the business 
activities they seek along positive lines with support from these three structures-
also leads to expanding the possibilities of the Korean powerhouses being 
specialized in the business sector on which they are focusing.Each Korean 
powerhouse as a parent company has maintained a specific sector-specialized 
business structure that is advantageous to focusing on the capabilities of both the 
Korean powerhouse and its main subsidiary companies (and its main subsidiary 
companies‘ subsidiary companies) in the same business sector; therefore, a 
favorable condition and environment that allows the Korean powerhouses to 
specialize more in one specific business sector than their rival companies is being 
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created. Based on such a business structure, the Korean powerhouses are able to 
gradually increase the possibility of being specialized in specific business sectors 
in the long term by expanding the business sectors of their subsidiary companies 
within the boundary of the business sectors on which the Korean powerhouses are 
focusing.Thus, it is possible for the Korean powerhouses—which focus on specific 
business sectors and are specialized in those sector—to occupy dominant market 
positions by securing the conditions and environment to help them concentrate 
their capabilities on the markets wherever there is demandwithout distinction 
between domestic and overseas market. 
In summary, it can be concluded that the Korean powerhouses have a structural 
mechanism in their corporate systems, as shown in Figure 10. The main point we 
would like to emphasize is that the five structures (or sectors) are actually 
interlocked as a single ―cogwheel,‖ but they ultimately act as one huge ―machine‖ 
while affecting (or being influenced by) each other. Consequentially, the entire 
corporate system of a Korean powerhousefunctions through the independent 
operation of various structures connected as a single machine. Further, a favorable 
condition and environment that allows the Korean powerhouses to secure a strong 
element of competition, such as the preoccupancy of a dominant market position, is 






In the late 1990s, the Korean government suffered an unprecedented financial 
crisis and began looking for new alternatives to its large enterprise-based and 
export-oriented growth strategy, as there was an element of doubt about this 
growth strategy. As a part of their comprehensive strategy, the government has 
attempted to actively prospect for small or middle-standing enterprises with high 
growth potential, and has given significant support to them through a diverse range 
of channels. Further, in order to promote these enterprises as those that can secure a 
strong element of competition in the global market, the government has put a lot of 
effort into fostering so-called ―Korean hidden champions‖until recently. 
This study examined various factors that support the 11 Korean powerhouses to 
secure dominant market positions in specific business sectors, and that create a 
business environment to maintain their market position. Further, we described how 
they have achieved high levels of self-reliance and unmatched competitiveness in 
the global market despite not being large business groups. To do so, we devoted 
our attention to examining five structures (i.e., financing structure, financial 
structure, growth structure, R&D activities, and business structure) that comprise 
each of the 11 companies‘ corporate systems, and focused on uncovering the 
structural mechanism that allows them to maintain their dominance. The results of 
this study can be summarized as follows: 
First, the self-financing-dominant financing structure, with its inherent stability, 
has been gradually established or maintained in their corporate systems, as the 
Korean powerhouses are more dependent on the self-financing method to obtain 
the funds necessary to manage their business activities, rather than the external 
financing method. 
Second, the Korean powerhouses tend to have a lower dependence on debt or 
loans to manage their business activities as the self-financing-dominant financing 
structure has been gradually established, and, as a result, their financial structure is 
likely to evolve towards the non-debt-dependent financial structure, or to maintain 
this structure. 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 3(2), W.J. Kim, p.284-308 
306 
306 
Third, as the Korean powerhouses are able to deviate from a corporate growth 
environment in whichvariations in debt are linked owing to the establishment of a 
self-financing-dominant financing structure and a non-debt-dependent financial 
structure, their growth structure is likely to evolve towards a non-debt-led growth 
structure, or to maintain this structure. 
Fourth, the stable business environment provided by the aforementioned three 
structures supports the Korean powerhouses in concentrating on their R&D 
activities at a high level. This allows the Korean powerhouses to specialize in the 
business sectors on which they are focusing. 
Finally, as the five structures discussed in this study act as a single ―machine,‖ a 
favorable environment that allows the Korean powerhouses to secure and maintain 
dominant positions in the global market is created. 
This study took a special interest in the 11 Korean powerhouses whose common 
ground is their occupation of dominant and unique market positions in specific 
business sectors despite not being large business groups. We examined the 
structural aspects of their corporate systems by uncovering key factors that allow 
for their success, based not on a business management perspective but on an 
economic perspective. To do this, we analyzed the characteristics of companies 
with growth potential as classified by the Korean government‘s current criteria, 
deciding on 11 companies (i.e., the Korean powerhouses) discussed in this study. 
These were chosen from among the 30 companies selected for the 2015 World-
Class 300 & Global Specialized Enterprise Cultivation Project. 
Recent study on Korean hidden champions has not been conducted using 
various perspectives and methodologies, and is not being expanded in either 
quantity or quality. In light of this, this study is different from previous studies, in 
that, based on a new perspective, we focused on uncovering a structural mechanism 
embedded in the corporate systems of the Korean powerhouses. The results of this 
study provide a ―stepping stone‖ for other standards and grounds to define Korean 
hidden champions. 
The concept of hidden champions in many previous studies is discussed in 
accordance with each researcher‘s own perspective, and it has been newly 
redefined in some studies. However, most studies basically adopt three criteria for 
hidden champions as introduced by Simon (1990). Of course, it is undeniable that 
the theoretical concept of the Korean powerhouses in this study is basically based 
on Simon‘s concept of hidden champions to a certain extent. However, through 
structural analysis of the Korean powerhouses, this study found that there is 
common ground on the various structures (or sectors) that comprise their corporate 
systems, and we consider this study to provide vital clues for extending an 
argument regarding hidden champions from a new perspective. Therefore, we 
would like to extend the concept of Korean hidden champions based on the various 
results of our analysis to propose the following six criteria useful to redefining 
them as Korean powerhouses: 
(i)  Number one in the global market (either the domestic market or the 
overseas market) 
(ii)  Higher level of dependence on self-financing than that on external 
financing 
(iii)  Low level of dependence on debt (below the norm in the industry) 
(iv)  Growth structure to which an increase in debt is irrelevant 
(v)  High level of concentration on research and development activities (above 
the norm in the industry) 
(vi)  Business structure with a better chance of specializing in a specific 
business sector 
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Nevertheless, there are limitations or other constraints in generalizing all 
companies with growth potential as the Korean powerhouses based on the above 
proposed standards alone. In this study, the subject of analysis is limited to just 11 
companies;therefore, it may be difficult to expand and generalize the findings here 
to an argument regarding the concept of hidden champions despite discussing the 
various structural features of these companies.However, this study attempted to 
exploring criteria that can be applied to extend the concept of hidden champions by 
focusing on structural features that have been mostly overlooked in previous 
studies; in addition, we attempted to propose various standards for defining the 
Korean powerhouses.Therefore, to support the findings of this study, we need to 
extend its scope to other various structures—including not only the aforementioned 
five structures, but also other structures (or sectors) that also comprise corporate 
systems. Furthermore, we acknowledge that by undertaking analyses of the 
correlations among various structures and an extended analysis of their features, we 





i Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) mentions a trickle-down effect from a pessimistic point of view, and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has pointed out the following: ―Exports, 
produced primarily by large firms affiliated with the business groups known as chaebols, are not 
having the same trickle-down impact as before on domestic demand and employment‖ (OECD, 
2015, p. 1). 
ii  Source: Korean Statistical Information Service, Mining and Manufacturing Survey. 
iii  For the remainder of this paper, the term ―global market‘ means the domestic or overseas market.  
iv See Article 2 of Framework Act on SMEs and Article 3 of Enforcement Decree of the Act. 
v See Article 2 of the Special Act on Facilitating Growth and Strengthening Competitiveness of 
Middle-Standing Enterprise. 
vi The United States: 129.4% in 2014 (source: Quarterly Financial Report, U.S. Department of 
Commerce); Japan: 120.7% in 2014 (source: Ministry of Finance, Financial Statements Statistics of 
Corporations); Germany: 221.3% in 2012 (source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Extrapolated results from 
financial statements of German enterprises). 
vii ―A holding company is characterized by its ownership of securities (generally common stock) of 
other companies for the purpose of influencing the management of those subsidiary companies, 
rather than for investment or other purposes‖ (Smith, 2003, p. 146-147). 
viii See Kim (2013; 2014; 2015b) for discussion of the evolving diversity of corporate systems based 
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